Abstract. We study self-selection into politics and effort once in office of citizens with different abilities and motivations in a framework where moonlighting is allowed. We find that high-ability motivated (public-fit) politicians exert higher effort in politics than high-ability non-motivated (market-fit) politicians, and that high-ability citizens, both public-fit and market-fit, may decide to enter politics. We test our predictions using a database of Italian parliamentarians for the period 1996-2006. We find evidence of advantageous selection of both market-fit and public-fit parliamentarians. We also show that public-fit parliamentarians have higher voting attendance and that only voting attendance of market-fit parliamentarians is negatively affected by income opportunities.
INTRODUCTION
The two main determinants of individual performance in the workplace are ability, i.e., the capacity to do a job, and motivation, i.e., the desire to perform and the satisfaction of performing a job. The importance of ability is practically axiomatic. By contrast, it is only recently that the role of motivation has been acknowledged by economists. For instance, Besley and Ghatak (2005) , Delfgaauw and Dur (2007) , and Stowe (2009) study the design of optimal incentives when agents are motivated, Handy and Katz (1998) analyze the selection of motivated managers in the non-profit sector, whilst Heyes (2005) investigates the nursing labor market.
The current paper focuses on a particular category of workers, namely politicians, and investigates their choices of self-selection into politics and effort once in office. In the literature on political selection quality of the political class is generally measured only by ability (Besley, 2004; Caselli and Morelli, 2004; Messner and Polborn, 2004) . Nevertheless, the motivation of politicians, or more generally of public servants, is one of the oldest topics discussed by public administration scholars, and one that has received their closest attention (see, e.g., Rainey and Steinbauer, 1999) . Public service motivation can be defined as 'an individual's predisposition to respond to motives grounded primarily or uniquely in public institutions and organizations' (Perry and Wise, 1990) . This notion has also been brought into economic thinking. Besley (2005, p. 49) , for example, argues that the motivation of politicians 'can be thought of as hard-wired into preferences rather being dependent on external reinforcement'.
Early literature on political selection assumes, in addition, that politics and the market are mutually exclusive. Since wages are mainly fixed in the public sector whilst markets reward ability, the common prediction is (adverse) selection of bad politicians. Only low-ability individuals will embrace a life of public service (Caselli and Morelli, 2004) . A recent stream of literature relaxes the hypothesis of mutually exclusive sectors, explicitly considering the option for politicians to keep on working in the market sector while in office, for instance as lawyers, entrepreneurs or consultants. This practice is referred to as moonlighting and it occurs in a number of countries. Outside employment is registered, among other seats of government, in the British House of Commons, in the German Bundestag, in the Italian Parlamento and in the European Parliament. Interestingly, Gagliarducci et al. (2010) , GNN henceforth, show that advantageous rather than adverse selection of politicians may occur when sideline jobs are taken into account. More exactly, they demonstrate that high-ability individuals are likely to run for office thanks to the possibility of moonlighting. Yet, for the same reason, they exert lower effort once in office. Similarly, Grossman and Hanlon (2014) study the impact of monitoring on effort and quality of democratically elected leaders in community organizations. They allow for the moonlighting option and, in line with GNN, find a trade-off between leader effort and ability.
In the current paper, we relax also the hypothesis that ability is the sole characteristic of individuals that matters. In particular, we introduce citizens with both heterogeneous abilities and heterogeneous motivations. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to investigate the role of motivations in shaping politicians' behaviour in a framework where moonlighting is allowed.
To model motivation, we rely on the notion of person-environment fit, broadly defined as the compatibility between an individual and a work environment. The idea that the person-environment fit can be a crucial determinant of work motivation has been popular in management literature since Parsons (1909) . Interestingly, this idea is not new in economics literature. Besley and Ghatak (2005) , e.g., argue that motivation of workers is positively affected by the extent to which they agree with the mission pursued by an organization.
In our theoretical framework, public-fit citizens are defined as fitting closely with the political sector environment in terms of value congruence. Such values may be either 'positive', for example, serving the interests of a community, or 'negative', for example, pursuing power and re-election through corruption and a policy of electoral patronage. These types of individuals are well fitted with the public sector because it is the environment where they are most likely to achieve their work goals.
1 On the contrary, market-fit citizens have a good fit with the market sector since their main work values are market-oriented, for example, they like market-type jobs and/or enjoy engaging in the pursuit of monetary incomes. Accordingly, in our theoretical framework we model these differences assuming that public-fit individuals get higher motivational rewards from doing politics than market-fit individuals. By the same token, market-fit citizens obtain higher motivational benefits than public-fit when working in the market sector.
Our theoretical findings are as follows. High-ability citizens may be attracted to politics. It is the moonlighting option that seduces high-ability market-fit individuals. In fact, they shirk once in office due to relatively low motivational rewards from doing politics, on one hand, and relatively high opportunity costs of giving up the sideline job, on the other hand. This is consistent with GNN. The novelty of our analysis lies in the incentive effects of public service motivation. We show that high-ability public-fit individuals may enter politics and refrain from shirking once in office, thanks to the significant motivational rewards they obtain when doing politics. 2 We test our predictions by relying on a unique dataset on members of the Italian Parliament (Camera dei Deputati and Senato) for the period 1996-2006. The dataset is the same as used by GNN. Among a wide set of covariates, it includes measures for effort while in office, mainly absenteeism in floor voting sessions and, as robustness check, the number of bills proposed. It contains also detailed information on outside income and pre-election income. The pre-election income, computed the year before individuals enter the parliament, can be considered as a proxy for individual ability in a within occupation-age-education dimension. A crucial issue in the empirical analysis is the definition of public-fit and market-fit individuals. To derive it, we exploit the information on political experience contained in the database. A public-fit politician is referred to as an individual that, before entering the parliament, had at least one political experience, as a town councilor or a mayor, for example, or the president/councilor of a province/region, or has shown party affiliation/appointment at the local and/ or national level. Market-fit politicians, by contrast, are defined as individuals with no previous political experience.
Consistent with our theoretical predictions about efforts once in office, the descriptive statistics show that the average absenteeism rate is higher for marketfit politicians than for public-fit ones, 35% vs. 28%. Even greater is the difference at the median, 30% vs. 20%. We also observe that the drop in income after entering parliament is much larger for public-fit than for market-fit politicians. As for the relation between outside income and effort, we find that the former has a (negative) effect only on the behavior of market-fit politicians. Interestingly, for public-fit politicians there is no statistical relation between effort and 2. The politicians' degree of person-environment fit has no welfare effect in our framework, with the consequence that, for any given level of ability, public-fit citizens are not necessarily better politicians. Our agnostic approach is due to the fact that we are not able to empirically disentangle between public-fit politicians' 'positive' and 'negative' goals. Nonetheless, what matters for our analysis is that motivation of public-fit politicians, either 'good' or 'bad', differ from that of market-fit politicians because of a different type of fit as its main determinant. For instance, both 'bad' public-fit and market-fit individuals may aim at making money. Yet the former prefer to operate in politics, working in parliament and resorting, for example, to corruption, while the latter opt for working hard in the market sector.
outside income. These findings are confirmed also when addressing endogeneity problems, i.e., using pre-election income as instrument, which, as mentioned, can be taken as a pre-determined measure of individual ability and as a predictor of outside income opportunities while in office. In particular, in our preferred specification an increase of one SD of outside income (145,000 euros) entails a 3.9 percentage point increase in the absenteeism rate of market-fit politicians. Further, since the definition of public-fit politicians is crucial to our analysis, we successfully apply a number of robustness checks by changing the baseline definition in various ways. As for selection into parliament, we show that both groups, the public-fit and the market-fit politicians, display a pre-election income greater than that of the Italian population, estimated using the comparable population from the Bank of Italy's Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). This evidence confirms that adverse selection of politicians does not occur. In the case of market-fit politicians, this is mainly due to the possibility of moonlighting. More specifically, we show that high-ability market-fit politicians enter parliament because this can allow them to reveal their skills to a wider audience and, at the same time, to enhance their network of acquaintances. The novelty of this paper concerns the behavior of public-fit politicians. As mentioned, they do not exploit the political position to foster their outside incomes, i.e., they seem to care less about moonlighting. Consistent with the theoretical model, a possible explanation of why high-ability public-fit politicians enter politics is that their relatively strong motivational rewards outdo their opportunity costs.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we survey the related literature. In Section 3, we lay out the theoretical framework. Robustness checks for the theoretical findings are included in the Online Appendix. In Section 4, we describe the data. In Section 5, we present the estimation results on the link between the effort exerted in parliamentary activities and the ability. Section 6 provides empirical evidence on selection into parliament. Section 7 concludes.
RELATED LITERATURE
Our paper connects, in the first place, with the literature on work motivation. Analysis of work motivation determinants has found particular attention in the organizational psychology, personnel psychology, and management literatures. The key notion is that of person-environment fit. Such fit can be defined as the match between the needs/desires of a person and what is offered by a job/task (Edwards, 1991) . In this context, a motivated politician may be thought of as an individual showing a high degree of fit with certain specific tasks required by parliamentary activity. A politician could be instead poorly motivated because she better fits with a particular job/task in the market sector. Alternatively, the person-environment fit can be seen as the compatibility between workers and the organization they work for in terms of value congruence (Tom, 1971) . In this case, a politician's motivation is positively affected by the degree of fit with the parliamentary institution as a whole and negatively affected by that with a A. Fedele and P. Naticchioni private organization whose specific goals are different from those pursued in the public sector.
In economics papers work motivation is modeled in many but substantially equivalent ways, the bottom line being that motivation impacts positively on individuals' productivity and/or utility. Handy and Katz (1998) , for example, assume that, for any given level of ability, more motivated workers are able to produce higher output. Similarly, Delfgaauw and Dur (2007) and Stowe (2009) suppose that motivation reduces workers' effort disutility. Finally, some authors assume that workers receive non-pecuniary benefits which increase with their level of motivation. In the current framework we opt for the last of these approaches (see, e.g., Delfgaauw and Dur 2010; Heyes 2005) .
Our setup is similar to that of DalB o et al. (2013) and Delfgaauw and Dur (2010) . Both these studies address individuals with different market abilities and different public service motivations. DalB o et al. (2013) study the role of financial remuneration in attracting applicants for public sector positions. Similarly, Delfgaauw and Dur (2010) study self-selection into public management. Since the focus is on public sector employees rather than politics, in both papers the public and market sectors are mutually exclusive.
In the political economy literature, Besley and Reynal-Querol (2011) , for example, argue that citizens are concerned with both competence and behavioral aspects of political leaders. Accordingly, a few papers have considered motivation, in addition to ability, as an explicit feature of politicians. Beniers and Dur (2007) investigate politicians who differ in competence and in how much they care about the public interest, yet their attention is concentrated on the electoral competition between new candidates and incumbent politicians, rather than the effects of motivation on self-selection into politics and on parliamentary activity. Caselli and Morelli (2001) bring in the element of honesty and assume that competent and honest citizens need the greatest inducement to enter politics. Adverse selection thus arises in that they might shun politics due to flat rewards for office.
The second strand of literature we contribute to is on political selection and incentive effects of moonlighting. As a preliminary remark, note that outside employment has not been widely covered in the political economy literature. This is probably because models that predict adverse selection in politics assume that the private and political sectors are mutually exclusive (Besley, 2004; Caselli and Morelli, 2004) . Such is the case of the United States, characterized by strict regulations for members of congress in relation to outside incomes. Nonetheless, in most of the OECD countries moonlighting is allowed. Furthermore, in recent years, more stringent disclosure rules have increased data availability on politicians' incomes, allowing for research analysis on this issue. For instance, Mattozzi and Merlo (2008) emphasize the role of public office in signaling ability that could be helpful in the market sector. However, in their paper, the two options of being a politician and working in the market sector are not simultaneously available, and high-ability citizens might stay in parliament for a short period, after which they could decide to exit to capitalize on their political experience.
Besides GNN and Grossman and Hanlon (2014) , mentioned in the introduction, several articles analyze the moonlighting phenomenon from an empirical point of view and confirm the existence of a trade-off between political and moonlighting activity. 3 In particular, Norris (1996) 
THEORETICAL SETUP
We consider a society with two types of citizens, denoted by i = p,m, who differ in terms of degree of fit with the public and market environments. Type-p (m) citizens have public (market) fit, whose characteristics are specified in Assumption 1 below. Citizens of both types have ability a, which is uniformly distributed in the interval [0, a] . Each citizen has the following two options.
(1) She may work full-time in the market sector. In this case she obtains an income M i ðaÞ ! 0, plus a motivational reward Q i from doing business. We let M 0 i ðaÞ [ 0, i.e., the higher the ability, the higher the market income. (2) Alternatively, citizens may become politicians. A politician gets a fixed salary W > 0 plus a motivational reward from doing politics, eR i ! 0, where e 2 [0,1] is the time devoted to political activities. In addition, a politician is allowed to work in the market sector while in office, i.e., she can moonlight. Yet, she is subject to a time constraint. If she increases time e dedicated to politics, she has less time 1 À e for her outside job. Total benefits from the moonlighting activity of a type-i politician are thus ð1 À eÞ½P i ðaÞ þ Q i , where ð1 À eÞP i ðaÞ, P 0 i ðaÞ [ 0, is a monetary income earned in the market while in office and ð1 À eÞQ i is the motivational reward from doing business while in office. 4 Summing up, the net payoff of becoming a politician for a type-i = p,m citizen is given by citizens get higher total benefits when working in the market sector,
Finally, we describe the timing of the model, which is solved backwards.
• At t = 0 the citizens choose whether to enter politics or not.
• At t = 1 citizens who have previously chosen to become politicians decide how much time e to dedicate to political activities and 1 À e to the sideline job.
Before proceeding, we stress that an important focus of our analysis is on selfselection decisions of running for office. This is why we disregard the role of political parties and voters in determining quality of the politicians. In other words, we assume that neither selection within parties nor voting game take place, where individuals can signal their ability and/or motivation, through, for example , their moonlighting activity. 
Effort once in office
In this subsection, we study the politicians' second-period choice of time e to be devoted to the political activity. Such a choice follows their first-period decision of entering politics, thus by giving up a full-time job in the market sector. Accordingly, we disregard À½M i ðaÞ þ Q i in (1) when writing the following type-i politician's problem:
The objective function is linear in e. Indeed, the derivative of (2) with respect to e is constant,
As a consequence, there are only two alternative corner solutions to problem (2), e = 1 when (3) is positive, e = 0 when (3) is negative. We denote with a Ã i the ability level such that 5. We do not impose any functional relation between ability and fit. Further, one might argue that (market) ability a should be distinguished by political skills because, for example , a high-ability individual may lack the competence and charisma to be a successful politician. Accordingly, we might enrich our framework by considering individuals characterized by a two-dimensional ability a ða 1 ; a 2 Þ, where a 1 denotes market ability and a 2 political skills (see Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008 , for a similar specification). Yet this is what we substantially do in Assumption 1 when considering fit in addition to ability as a characteristic of citizens. For any given level of a, a publicfit individual can be thought of as having higher political skills than a market-fit one due to the right fit; for the same reason, a market-fit individual is more successful in her private activity. A similar characterization is proposed by Ferraz and Finan (2009) who measure the quality of legislators through education, type of previous profession, and political experience in office. The last feature corresponds precisely to our empirical definition of public fit.
The LHS of (4) decreases with a since P 0 i ðaÞ [ 0. Politicians whose ability is lower than a Ã i exert thus maximum effort in politics, i.e., they choose e Ã i 1. Politicians whose ability is higher than a Ã i are instead completely dedicated to the private activity, i.e., they choose e Ã i 0. The explanation of this result is simple. Since the motivational reward in politics, eR i , is not affected by ability, while the opportunity cost of devoting to the political activity is increasing in ability, ð1 À eÞP 0 i ðaÞ [ 0, only citizens with relatively low ability spend time doing politics.
More interestingly, applying the implicit function theorem to (4) yields In what follows, we restrict our attention to the case where public-fit politicians choose to fully devote to the political activity for any level of ability a. In symbols,
The role of this hypothesis is discussed in Section 1 of the Online Appendix. We sum up our findings in the following The result of Lemma 1 hinges upon the concepts of public fit and market fit. Ceteris paribus, public-fit politicians derive higher benefits, R p [ R m , and incur lower opportunity costs, P p þ Q p \ P m þ Q m , than market-fit colleagues when they exert maximum effort in politics. This is why public-fit politicians give up moonlighting even for high levels of ability.
Selection into politics: public-fit citizens
In this subsection, we focus on public-fit citizens and study their first-period decision of entering politics. According to Lemma 1, public-fit citizens select e Ã p 1 at t = 1. Plugging such a value into (1) with i = p yields the net payoff of becoming politician for a type p,
The above expression is decreasing in the ability level, @p p ða; e Ã p Þ= @a ¼ ÀM 0 p ðaÞ \ 0. This is because a public-fit individual gives up moonlighting A. Fedele and P. Naticchioni once in office. As a result, her opportunity costs of becoming a politician increase with a since markets reward ability, @½Q p þ M p ðaÞ=@a [ 0, whilst total reward in politics is fixed.
In Figure 1 we represent p Ã p ða; e Ã p Þ as a linear function of ability a given the optimal time spent doing politics by public-fit citizens, e Ã p 1.
6 Parameter a p;1 in Figure 1 denotes the ability level such that a public-fit citizen is indifferent between entering politics or not. In symbols,
Obviously, public-fit citizens enter politics at t = 0 if and only if p p ða; e Ã p Þ is non-negative. Two conclusions can thus be drawn.
(1) If a p;1 ! a, i.e., if
public-fit citizens enter politics for any level of ability. This case is represented by the upper line in Figure 1 . Adverse selection does not occur because of a relatively high motivational reward from doing politics, R p , which outdoes the opportunity cost of being a top-ability politician who exerts maximum effort, Q p þ M p ðaÞ À W. An interesting conclusion can be drawn. Top-ability public-fit individuals enter politics and do not shirk.
(2) If a p;1 \ a, i.e., if
Figure 1 Selection of public-fit citizens 6. In Figure 1 , as well as in Figure 2 below, we let p i ð0; 1Þ ¼ W þ R i À ½M i ð0Þ þ Q i be positive. This simply means that a zero-ability citizen, both public-fit and market-fit, decides to enter politics and to give up moonlighting due to her small opportunity cost M i ð0Þ þ Q i . Moreover, one can easily check that nothing substantial changes in our analysis if p i ða; e Ã i Þ is assumed to be nonlinear, provided it is continuous and monotonic.
public-fit citizens with ability a a p;1 enter politics, while public-fit citizens with ability a [ a p;1 do not. This is the classical adverse selection effect and it is represented by the lower line in Figure 1 .
For the sake of completeness, in Section 2 of the Online Appendix, we study the remaining scenarios concerning public-fit and market-fit citizens' entry choice at t = 0.
Selection into politics: market-fit citizens
We now turn to market-fit citizens and study their first-period decision to enter politics. According to Lemma 1, their second-period effort choice is 
Derivative (11) suggests that market-fit politician's payoff is decreasing in ability when she does not moonlight, i.e., when a a In Figure 2 we draw the optimal net payoff p (4) and (10). We first focus on interval a a Ã m and calculate the ability level a m;1 such that a market-fit citizen is indifferent between entering politics and giving up moonlighting or not entering,
We then turn to interval a [ a Ã m and denote with a m;0 the ability level such that a market-fit citizen is indifferent between entering politics and doing moonlighting or not entering,
Market-fit citizens enter politics at t = 0 if and only if p m ða; e Ã m Þ is non-negative. We consider two alternative cases. and a m;0 \ a market-fit citizens with ability a a m;0 enter politics, while those with ability a [ a m;0 do not. In both cases adverse selection occurs.
Predictions
The above theoretical model provides some predictions on politicians' effort and self-selection choices. They can be summarized by the following proposition. Proposition 1. The solution to the two-period model described above is as follows: t = 1 Only market-fit politicians' effort is decreasing in ability according to Lemma 1. In other words, only high-ability market-fit politicians do moonlight, whilst high-ability public-fit ones do not. t = 0 High-ability market-fit citizens enter (do not enter) politics if the political position has a positive (negative) effect on the market activity, P . By contrast, high-ability public-fit citizens enter (do not enter) politics if their relatively high motivational reward from doing politics outdoes (is outdone by) their relatively high opportunity cost due to their larger effort, R p ! ð\ÞQ p þ M p ðaÞ À W.
In Section 1 of the Online Appendix, we check the robustness of our theoretical findings along the following three aspects: (i) we relax Assumption 2; (ii) we follow the existing economics literature on work motivation by assuming that the opportunity cost of entering politics is influenced just by ability; (iii) we suppose that the population of public-fit citizens is characterized by a lower maximum level of ability than the population of market-fit.
DATA AND INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
We make use of a dataset on the members of the Italian Parliament (Camera dei Deputati and Senato) for the period 1996 -2006 (two legislatures, XIII, 1996 -2001 , and XIV, 2001 . 7 The database provides a rich set of individual characteristics for politicians: political experience, appointments in parliament, political party affiliation, electoral system, district of election, coalition type, self-declared demographics, absences, bills and incomes. 8 Before defining the empirical counterparts of the theoretical variables, we observe that the Italian case is particularly well suited to investigate the moonlighting phenomenon because regulation of outside activities has not changed since its introduction in 1957 (Decreto del Presidente della Repubblica, N.361). Outside employment is monitored by the Committee on Elections (Giunta per le Elezioni), which is the institutional body for decisions related to the incompatibility with other non-elective public offices. Magistrates, academics, and any other public servants cannot simultaneously hold a position in parliament. They 7. It is the same database used in GNN to make the results comparable. The data sources include:
the Annals of the Italian Parliament (La Navicella) for the demographic information, edited by Editoriale Italiana; The Archive of Tax Returns for the members of Italian Parliament (Servizio Prerogative e Immunit a), which provided the personal income information; the Press Office of the Italian Parliament for statistics on individual attendance and the parliament salary. See GNN for further details. 8. It is worth remarking that in 1994 the electoral rule was changed from a proportional system to a mixed system characterized by 25% of members elected under a proportional rule and 75% under a majoritarian one. Our data refer to legislatures XIII and XIV, being therefore homogeneous with respect to the electoral rule. Note also that the number of seats (945) are asked to leave on absence. In few cases, such as an executive manager of a state-owned or state-assisted company, or other elective offices (mayors or governors), leave on absence is not allowed, and thus a choice must be made between a seat in parliament and these activities. Besides these incompatibilities, no limits are set to the amount of outside activity.
Definition of variables of interest and descriptive statistics
Let us now move to the empirical counterpart of the variables introduced in the theoretical model. A first crucial aspect concerns the choice of a proxy for the dedication of a member of parliament. This is not an easy task since effort in parliament is a multidimensional object. Being aware of it, we proxy the time devoted to parliamentary activity with the absenteeism rate in electronic floor voting sessions. 9 As a robustness check measure, we make use of bills as main sponsor, i.e., the politician is the 'first name' ('primo firmatario') in proposing bills. However, this measure might be considered as a less precise proxy for effort, since it is not always clear who actually spent time on preparing bills, whether the administrative staff or the politician herself.
Another important variable in the empirical analysis is the proxy for ability. For freshmen, i.e., members for the first time in parliament, our rich dataset includes the gross total income one year before election. Since in the econometric analysis, we control for occupation, age and education, we argue that higher pre-election income signals higher ability in a within occupation-age-education dimension. This seems to be a reasonable assumption. Having a proxy for ability is crucial in the empirical analysis, hence we focus on the sample of freshmen.
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The data also provides the gross salary from parliament and the gross total income, both earned and unearned, of all members of parliament. It is then possible to recover a measure of outside income by taking the difference between gross total income and gross parliamentary salary (which is constant, up to some inflation adjustment) in a specific year. Since absences are measured per term, we take the average of outside income over the term. 9. Non-attendance because of legitimate reasons, such as parliament missions and cabinet meetings, are not considered as an absence. It is worth mentioning that electronic votes account for about 90% of total floor votes, the rest being held with hand counting. 10. The use of preelection market income as a proxy for ability has also been proposed, e.g., by Galasso and Nannicini (2011) . Further, a recent paper by Besley et al. (2013) proposes to use as a proxy for ability the individual fixed effects derived in a panel regression of income on control variables. We cannot do the same because we observe pre-election income only for one year in our data, hence we cannot carry out panel estimates. 11. In particular we take the average of outside incomes from the third to the fifth year in the legislature, as in GNN. We cannot consider the tax records of the first year in parliament, since they refer to the year before the entry into parliament. Similarly, it is not possible to include the second year, since the tax records refer to the entry year in parliament that usually takes place in June and hence contain two-time periods, before and after the entry. Furthermore, having only earned income, which requires an effort to be achieved, would have been preferable. However, GNN checked on a random sample of politicians the importance of unearned income, finding that properties are not considerable in number and do not play a substantial role. Note that even if total income were not a perfect proxy for earned income, it could still be a good measure of politicians' private activities, as far as unearned income also requires some duties of management.
Probably the most important issue regarding the empirical counterpart of motivation. Since our data are very rich for what concerns past political activity, we exploit this set of variables to derive the following baseline definition. A public-fit member is defined as an individual that had at least one of the following political experiences before entering the parliament:
-mayor or councillor of a municipality; -president or councillor of a province; -president or councillor of a region; -member of the European parliament; -affiliation to/appointment in a political party at the local and/or national level.
The intuition behind this definition is straightforward. Members of parliament with previous political experiences have already shown interest for politics, for the community they live in, have shown their willingness to dedicate time/effort to political activities. This is especially true because most of the experiences considered concern activities either with no monetary rewards, such as being affiliated to a political party at the local level (almost 35% of freshmen with previous political experiences), or with negligible monetary rewards, such as being a councillor of a municipality (55%) or mayor of a municipality (almost 30%).
12 Since this definition is crucial in the empirical analysis, we carry out a wide set of robustness checks in Subsection 5.1.
Consistent with the baseline definition of public-fit politicians, market-fit politicians are referred to as individuals who enter parliament directly from the market sector, without any declared political experience neither at the institutional level (municipality, province, region, European parliament) nor at the party level (local and national). It is interesting to note that a non-negligible share of freshmen (31.7%) are market-fit politicians, i.e., with no political experience before entering parliament, while 68.3% are public-fit politicians, i.e., with at least one of the aforementioned past political experiences. Table 1 includes the descriptive statistics for absenteeism rate, bills as main sponsor, pre-election income and outside income, split by public-fit and marketfit politicians. 13 The absenteeism rate is higher for market-fit politicians than for public-fit ones, 35% vs. 28%, and this difference is statistically different from zero. Even stronger is the difference at the median, 30% vs. 20%. In a similar 12. Only mayors of big cities earn high salary (more than 5,000 euros per month). Salary of mayors of municipalities, which are on average small, can be less than 2,000 euros per month. The amount is even lower for councillors. To make a comparison with wages in the Italian private labour market, we remark that in 2000 the Italian gross mean (median) wage was equal to around € 1900 (€ 1650) -source: INPS administrative data. 13. As already stressed, we focus on the group of freshmen. Moreover, as in GNN, we drop outliers from the sample. Outliers are individuals earning either more than 2 million euros as gross preelection and/or outside income, as well as those earning less than 15,000 euros as gross pre-election income. Note that most of outliers refer to individuals with low pre-election incomes before entering, for instance because they were either unemployed or only partially attached to the labour market. This sample definition applies throughout the empirical analysis and is consistent with the fact that the pre-election income is considered as a proxy for ability and hence we have to drop politicians for which this proxy does not apply to.
vein, public-fit politicians propose more bills as the main sponsor, 8 vs. 7.45, even if in this case the difference is not significant. As for income variables, it comes out that pre-election income is 32% higher for market-fit politicians, 128,000 vs. 97,000 euro. Interestingly, the difference strongly increases once in office, i.e., the outside income for market-fit politicians is 81% greater than for public-fit ones. Similar results are derived when considering the median, 32% difference in pre-election incomes and 83% for outside incomes. One might argue that these differences are at least partially due to a composition effect, i.e., market-fit politicians being self selected into better-paying occupations. To address this issue, we carry out a regression analysis by using the logarithm of pre-election income and of outside income as dependent variables, a dummy variable equal to one for public-fit politicians as main covariate, and by controlling for all variables included in Table 2 , which are described in the next paragraph. The coefficient of the dummy for public-fit politicians represents the percentage difference in pre-election incomes between the two groups. Using OLS, the disparity between the two groups dampens, even if it is still equal to 20% for pre-election incomes and to 58% for outside incomes. Relying on median quantile regression, the percentage difference is 14% for pre-election incomes and 53% for outside incomes.
The above evidence suggests that differences in incomes between market-fit and public-fit politicians exist before entering the parliament and that such differences get wider during the mandate. This descriptive evidence is consistent with the basic intuition of Lemma 1: public-fit politicians exert larger effort once in office.
In the econometric analysis, we make use of the following wide set of control variables available in the dataset: individual covariates (male, age, graduate, occupation in 11 dummies); information about the parliament mandate (house of representatives, legislature, appointments in the parliament -president/vice president/secretary in parliament/committee); information on the parliamentary election and appointments (having been elected in a majoritarian -instead of a proportional-election, district of election -Northwest, Northeast, Center, South, Islands); party information (being in a left wing party -this dummy is equal to zero for individuals belonging to the center-wing and right-wing parties -being in a party included in the government coalition); being member of a second parliament committee. Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics for market-fit and public-fit politicians. It emerges that public servants, i.e., teachers and bureaucrats, are more concentrated among public-fit politicians, as well as in left wing parties. Further, the graduate rates in the two groups are much higher than that of the Italian population, which was for instance equal to 12.2% in 2005, and it is greater among market-fit politicians. It is interesting to observe that the two types of politicians are almost equally distributed even in more 'market-oriented' occupations, such as entrepreneurs, lawyers, self-employed, managers.
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: EFFORT AND INCOMES
In this section, we analyze the empirical relation between parliamentary effort and income variables. We first focus on effort while in office and pre-election Notes: Politicians with more than two million Euros of pre-election and outside income, and less than fifteen thousand Euros of pre-election income, are excluded. Life senators and ministers excluded.
income, the latter being a proxy for individual ability in a within age-educationoccupation dimension. We estimate the following equation using OLS,
where j is the observation/individual, a j;t is the absenteeism rate, M j;tÀ1 is the preelection income, and X j;t is the full set of controls included in Table 2 . A positive relation between pre-election incomes and absenteeism rates applies when considering the whole sample of freshmen politicians, as in the first column of Table 3. 14 When focusing on the sample of market-fit politicians, we find that individuals with higher pre-election incomes are associated with higher absenteeism rates. More exactly, one SD of pre-election income, 131,000 euros, is associated with a 2.8 percentage point increase in absenteeism rate, a not negligible amount given that the average absenteeism is around 30%. Interestingly, for public-fit politicians the coefficient is still positive but lower and not statistically different from zero. This evidence is consistent with the findings summed up in Lemma 1, according to which effort once in office is decreasing in ability only for market-fit politicians. 15 We then move on considering the relation between absenteeism rate and outside income. Investigating the role of outside income is crucial because outside income can be an indicator of the time constraint between public and market activities. Moreover, the dynamics of market returns might substantially change after election and in a possibly different way between market-fit and public-fit, as also shown by the descriptive statistics. We estimate the following equation, a j;t ¼ cP j;t þ bX j;t þ e j;t ; ð17Þ whereP j;t is the realized outside income, i.e., the empirical counterpart of (1Àe)P(a). The first column of Table 4 shows that for the whole set of politicians, the coefficient is equal to 0.02. When splitting the sample, the coefficient for market-fit politicians is even greater and statistically different from zero: an increase in one SD of outside income, 136,000 euros, entails a 2.93 percentage point increase in the absenteeism rate. For public-fit politicians, the coefficient is instead lower in magnitude and not statistically different from zero. We also briefly discuss the other covariates in Table 4 . In particular, for both market-fit and public-fit politicians (columns 2 to 5), a lower rate of absence is associated with being older, being elected in the House of Representatives, being in the government coalition or in a left wing party. Only for public-fit politicians, being a journalist or an entrepreneur increases absences, while being elected in the north of the country has a negative impact. Interestingly, the impact of being elected in a majoritarian system, rather than in a proportional system, is not statistically different from zero.
14. This is in line with GNN. Yet our coefficient is slightly different because in the current paper we have to drop some covariates, for example, variables concerning previous political experiences were used to define the group of public-fit politicians. 15. Since the absenteeism rate is bounded between 0 and 1, we implemented the generalized linear model (GLM) estimator proposed by Papke and Wooldridge (1996) as a methodological robustness check. Results are quantitatively the same as those in Table 3 . Accordingly, in the rest of the paper, we make use of OLS, both for the sake of simplicity and because with OLS it is straightforward to apply an instrumental variable approach.
However, an endogeneity problem arises becauseP j;t is jointly determined with a j;t . As in GNN, we instrumentP j;t with the pre-election income M j;tÀ1 , which can be taken as a pre-determined measure of individual ability and as a predictor of outside income opportunities while in office. We assume that pre-election income affects a i;t only throughP j;t . In such a way, we recover the effect of outside income opportunities P j;t on a i;t , rather than the mechanical correlation between the realized outside incomeP j;t and the time devoted to parliamentary activities. Columns (4) and (5) of Table 4 show that for market-fit politicians, the coefficient is greater and significant, while it is still not significant for public-fit politicians. Note also that the F-test confirms that the instruments are not weak.
This evidence can be further refined when explicitly considering the issue of national politicians, i.e., politicians with current appointments in the party at the national level. National politicians are more likely not to attend the voting session for political reasons, such as participation in electoral and party meetings. Not surprisingly, most of the current national politicians (78%) are included in the public-fit group, and this might alter the relation between Notes: ***p < 0.01, **p < 0.05, and *p < 0.1. Robust standard errors in parentheses (showed only for the variable of interest). Dependent variable: absenteeism rate. Income measures are in hundred thousand of euros (2004 prices). Politicians with more than two million Euros of pre-election and outside income, and less than fifteen thousand Euros of pre-election income, are excluded. Life senators and ministers excluded. All control variables are dummies, apart from Age. In columns (4) and (5) outside income is instrumented with pre-election income.
absenteeism rate and outside income. For this reason, we claim that Table 5 includes our preferred specification, with OLS and 2SLS estimates concerning the relation between absenteeism rate and outside income for the sample of freshmen after excluding the current national politicians. Interestingly, the differences between the two groups get wider. For market-fit politicians, the coefficients become higher and still significant: an increase in one SD of outside income, 148,000 euros, generates a 3.9 percentage point increase in the absenteeism rate. For public-fit politicians, the coefficients are instead much lower, very close to zero, and not statistically significant. 16 Finally, the impact of the control variables is similar to that discussed for Table 4. 17 Finally, we carry out the same regressions, both OLS and 2SLS, by relying on an alternative proxy for effort, the number of bills as the main sponsor. In Table  6 , we can see that OLS coefficients are negative -the higher the outside incomes, the lower the number of bills proposed -but not statistically different from zero for the two groups. As expected, the effect is anyway stronger for market-fit politicians. Interestingly, when resorting to 2SLS we find that outside income decreases the amount of bills proposed for market-fit politicians in a significant way, whilst the coefficient is not statistically different from zero for public-fit politicians. We can conclude that also findings concerning bills are consistent with the predictions of Lemma 1. 
Effort and outside income: robustness checks
In this subsection, we provide some robustness checks concerning mainly the identification of the public-fit politicians' group. We refer to Fedele and Naticchioni (2013) for additional details.
The first robustness check concerns the definition of public-fit politicians. One might argue that the intensity of previous political experiences should be taken into account in that individuals with only one political experience might be motivationally similar to those with no political experience but different from those with three or four experiences. To test the robustness of our results with respect to this issue, we introduce two alternative definitions of public-fit politicians, based on a stronger intensity of previous political experience. We define as public-fit politicians individuals with at least two or three of the aforementioned 16. Note that the difference between market-fit and public-fit coefficients in Table 5 is statistically different from zero, while this was not the case for coefficients in Table 4 . To test the statistical difference in coefficients, we carry out a regression on a pooled sample of politicians, both public-fit and market-fit, introducing an interaction term between outside income and a public-fit dummy. As standard when using the interaction term, the instrument for the interaction is equal to the instrument times the interaction dummy. In this case, also point estimates are different: the baseline coefficient for market-fit is 0.34 and the interaction term is À0,25, statistically significant. The F-stat of the first stage is 13. 17. Note also that these results might be driven, at least partially, by the role of post-congressional returns (Mattozzi and Merlo, 2008) . In other words, we cannot exclude the fact that public-fit politicians might exert higher effort in order to increase the probability to obtain future appointments in the public or market sector. Unfortunately, we do not have the data to test this possible explanation. 18. Table 6 is based on the baseline sample of politicians of Table 4 . When excluding national politicians, as in Table 5 , results are basically the same.
political experiences. Results in Fedele and Naticchioni (2013) shows that the coefficients are still highly not significant, both using OLS and 2SLS. This suggests that our results are not sensitive to the change in the intensity of previous political experiences (4) and (5) outside income is instrumented with pre-election income.
The second robustness check is still focused on alternative definitions of public-fit politicians. Political experiences acquired before entering parliament can be divided into two main categories. The first one concerns formal institutional appointments, such as having been major or councillor of a municipality, (4) and (5) outside income is instrumented with pre-election income.
president or councillor of a region/province, member of the European parliament. These are full-time remunerated occupations which require demanding effort. The second category includes instead party affiliation/appointment at the local or national level, which can represent a more passive role, on the one hand, and can be thought of as being more related to pure motivation, on the other hand. To explicitly take into account possible differences between these two subgroups, we make use of two additional definitions of public-fit politicians: (i) individuals with institutional appointments but no party affiliation/appointment before entering the parliament; (ii) individuals with party affiliation/appointments but no institutional appointments before entering the parliament. OLS and 2SLS estimates in Fedele and Naticchioni (2013) confirm that for both group coefficients are always very close to zero and not statistically significant.
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The third and final robustness check concerns the definition of market-fit politicians. One might argue that modifying the definition of public-fit politicians should imply a change in the definition of the group of market-fit politicians, with the latter defined as the residual group with respect to the different definitions of the public-fit group. To take this issue on board, we also estimate equation (17) by OLS and 2SLS for the market-fit groups that emerge as residual of all the various definitions of public-fit politicians used so far. Estimates in Fedele and Naticchioni (2013) show that in basically all cases the coefficients remain positive and statistically significant and their magnitude close to that of Table 5 .
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS: SELECTION AND MOTIVATION
In this section, we investigate the issue of politicians' selection. 20 As in GNN, we begin the analysis by comparing the pre-election incomes of politicians with incomes of the Italian population. The latter are estimated by means of the SHIW data for the year 1995 and 2000. These are the years in which it is observed the pre-election income of freshmen politicians elected in 1996 and 2001, respectively. Almost every politician in the sample was employed before appointment. Accordingly, we extract individuals who declared to be employed in the SHIW. Because of differences in the occupation coding, only managers, entrepreneurs, self-employed, lawyers, clerks, teachers, and blue collars can be matched. The sample is also restricted to individuals aged 25-60. 21 We end up with a sample of 507 politicians (321 public-fit and 186 market-fit).
19. Following Br€ andle and Stutzer (2013), in Fedele and Naticchioni (2013) we carried out another robustness check concerning an alternative definition of public-fit based on politicians coming from the public sector, i.e., public servants. Also in this case the baseline findings for public-fit were confirmed, using both OLS and 2SLS. 20. Note that since the regulation of outside income in Italy never changed during the period of time covered by the dataset, it is not possible to directly test the implications of our model in terms of political selection due to a variation in the moonlighting rules. 21. The choice of these thresholds are due to the fact that the minimum age for being candidate to the House of Representatives is 25 years, 40 to the Senate. Further, since the SHIW only provides net total income, we derived the same measure for politicians by subtracting the net tax reported in the tax returns from the gross pre-election income. Following Brandolini (1999) , it is possible to take into account under-reporting in the SHIW by increasing the income of the Italian population by 30% for self employed and 15% for employees. By contrast, there is no problem of under-reporting for the parliamentarians' income for tax returns are available. Figure 3 shows the comparison between the income distribution of the Italian population and that of the two groups of politicians. Interestingly, both publicfit and market-fit politicians are clearly to the right of the Italian population, suggesting an advantageous selection for the two groups. It is also worth stressing that the distribution of public-fit politicians is slightly on the left of that of the market-fit. One might believe this evidence is due to disparities in composition among the three groups. For this reason we carry out quantile regressions over the whole sample of the Italian population and over the two groups of politicians. We control for individual covariates (age, gender, year dummy, five job dummies, and four education dummies) and we introduce two dummies, one for market-fit politicians and one for public-fit politicians. Incomes are in logarithm to derive percentage changes. Figure 4 includes public-fit and market-fit politicians' pre-election income premia with respect to the Italian population. It clearly confirms that an advantageous selection is at stake. 22 Further, premia for the two groups increase along the income distribution. It is also interesting to observe that the premia for public-fit politicians are lower than those of market-fit ones, confirming what we derived in Figure 3 , and that the difference between the two groups slightly increases along the distribution, i.e., gaps in pre-election incomes are greater at the top of the distribution.
The fact that the premia for being politicians increase along the distribution suggests that high-ability citizens might have a relative advantage once they enter into parliament, i.e., the marginal return to ability for market income is greater when appointed than when not appointed. The theoretical model showed that this is prerequisite to observe high-ability market-fit politicians in parliament: see Proposition 1. The condition is formally stated in expression (12), which can be rewritten as follows, Log (net) pre-election income A. Fedele and P. Naticchioni Deciles of pre-electoin income Market-fit Public-fit Figure 4 Pre-election income premia for public-fit and market-fit politicians 
Condition (18) is fulfilled if the pre-election coefficient h i is greater than one, H 0 : h i 5 1. Since it is not possible to observe the outside income opportunities P (a) but just the realized outside income e PðaÞ, we include absences in voting sessions as an additional control to recover an estimate of h for the same level of effort e. Results are included in Table 7 , according to which h m [ 1 in case of market-fit politicians, while h p ¼ 1 in case of public-fit politicians. 23 This means that high-ability market-fit politicians enter the parliament since they can benefit from higher marginal returns to ability once in office, for instance because they have the chance to reveal their skills to a wider audience, or because of network spillovers. This finding is in line with GNN. The novelty of this contribution lies in the evidence on public-fit politicians, who seem not to exploit the political position to improve their private business.
Overall, we find a clear advantageous selection of public-fit politicians compared with the Italian population. This suggests that public-fit politicians have to be considered as high-ability individuals. Yet they are less skilled than market-fit, with the gap increasing along the pre-election income distribution. Further, public-fit do not display higher marginal returns to ability once in office, h p ¼ 1. Our theoretical framework provides two different explanations for these findings.
The first possible explanation is related to Figure 1 . Suppose that a p;1 , the ability level such that a public-fit citizen is indifferent between entering politics or not, is slightly lower than a, a p;1 ¼ a À e. In this case, only public-fit individuals belonging to the very upper tail of the ability distribution shun politics because their motivational rewards, even if higher than those of market-fit, are not sufficient to cover large opportunity costs they bear as top-ability politicians who give up moonlighting. This might explain why public-fit politicians are advantageously selected from the Italian population, on one hand, but display lower pre-election income with respect to market-fit ones, on the other hand. Top-ability market-fit citizens decide to enter because they know they will moonlight once in office, while top-ability public-fit potential candidates do not enter since they know they will not moonlight.
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The second possible explanation is related to the last robustness check of our theoretical findings discussed in Section 1 of the Online Appendix, according to which the group of public-fit citizens might be characterized by a lower 23 . As in GNN we restrict the analysis to individuals for which pre-election incomes is more likely to reflect individual skills. We thus remove from the initial sample of freshmen those members that are former army officers, students, current political party officials, trade unionists, clerks, blue collars, and teachers. Further, to address the endogeneity issue due to the fact that the absenteeism rate and outside income are equilibrium outcomes, we use the same instrument variable as in GNN. The instrument for the absenteeism rate is the time distance (in hours) between Rome and the province of residence, where politicians' outside activities are likely to be located (see GNN for details on the instrument). The results do not differ much in comparison to the baseline estimates, and are available on request. 24. Here we suppose public-fit politicians exert high effort once in office for any ability level. Following the first robustness check discussed in Section 1 of the Online Appendix, we could relax Assumption 2 by letting a Ã p \ a, in which case high-ability public-fit individuals enter and then moonlight, like the market-fit politicians do. However, we would expect to observe h p [ 1 to fit this scenario. maximum level of ability than that of market-fit, due to ex-ante self-selection. In symbols, a p \a m ¼ a, with inequality R p ! Q p þ M p ða m Þ À W being fulfilled. The opportunity costs borne by public-fit individuals when entering politics diminish due to their relatively low ability, M p ða m Þ \ M p ðaÞ. Consequently, the motivational rewards R p might be sufficient to cover such costs. This would explain the differences in pre-election income between the two groups, especially at the top of the distribution, as well as why public-fit politicians may not be able to exploit their political position to improve private business.
In conclusion, note that even though it is not possible to test empirically which explanation applies since they are observationally equivalent, both support the punchline of the paper that motivation matters. 25 
CONCLUSION
In this paper, we investigated the role of motivation on political selection and effort once in office. We adopted a framework where moonlighting is allowed and agents are heterogeneous in terms of ability and motivation. We showed that the opportunistic behavior of high-ability parliamentarians highlighted by the previous literature (GNN and Grossman and Hanlon, 2014) could be mitigated by public service motivation. More precisely, we found that high-ability public-fit individuals may enter politics and refrain from shirking once in office. This may be because they get high motivational rewards from doing politics, which outdo the significant opportunity costs they bear as politicians who give up moonlighting.
Overall, our results confirm the importance of acknowledging the role of work motivation when studying self-selection and effort choices in vocational labor markets, such as politics.
Finally, we believe that our paper could contribute to the long-standing debate on the regulation of politicians' moonlighting. From a normative point of view our analysis suggests that declaring outside jobs as incompatible with the political mandate should affect the entry decision of citizens with poor public service motivation. More precisely, lacking the moonlighting option, high-ability market-fit individuals are likely not to enter politics because their motivational rewards are low relatively to the opportunity costs they would bear as full-time 25. A last remark is related to the probability to be a candidate for the next legislative term. This is something that goes beyond our static theoretical framework. Yet we expect that public-fit politicians display higher probability to run for office in the next election, since they enjoy higher motivational rewards in doing politics and, at the same time, they incur lower opportunity costs. Conversely, market-fit politicians could have higher incentives in leaving politics given h m [ 1. To test this hypothesis, we carry out a probit model using as dependent variable a dummy equal to one if the Member of Parliament is a candidate in the next election. The main covariate is the baseline public-fit politician dummy. We control for all variables included in Table 2 as well as pre-election and outside incomes, and absenteeism rate. Computing the marginal effects it comes out that public-fit politicians' probability to run for office in the next election is 14% higher than that of market-fit. This is consistent with our expectations and to the predictions of Mattozzi and Merlo (2008) who stress the importance of post-congressional returns in driving the following behavior of high-ability market-fit citizens: they serve for a period and then leave parliament to capitalize on the political experience.
